SSME FMEA/CIL REDUNDANCY SCREEN

Component Group:

Ignilers and Sansors

CIL (tem: Component:

J223-01, J224-01

Part Number: Fallure Mode: FPB and OPB Purge Pressure Transducers (P2.5, P2.4) RE2233/RES7001, RE2233/RES7001 No output or erroneous output signal.

Prepared;

M. Oliver

Approved: Approval Date: Change #;

T. Nguyen 3/30/99

Directive #:

CCBD ME3-01-4994

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Phase	Failure / Effect Description	Chilicality (
S 4.5	Erroneous output signals (rom both qualified sensors or remaining qualified sensor within the redline limit results in loss of redline protection. Loss of vehicle due to AS) line burnout may result if check valve leakage exists and is not detected.	1R ME-82\$
	Redundancy Screens: SENSOR SYSTEM - VALVE SYSTEM: UNLIKE REDUNDANCY	
	 A: Pass - Redundant hardware items are capable of checkout during normal ground turnaround. B: Fail - Loss of a redundant hardware items is not detectable during flight. C: Pass - Loss of redundant hardware items could not result from a single credible event. 	

SSME <u>EA/CIL</u> DESIGN

Component Group: CIL Item:

Igniters and Sensors J223-01, J224-01

Component.

FPB and OPB Purga Pressure Transducers (P2.6, P2.4)

Part Number: Falture Mode: RE2233/RES7001, RE2233/RES7001 No output or erronagus output signal, Prepared:

M. Oliver T. Nguyan

Approved: Approval Date:

3/30/99

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Design / Document Reference

FAILURE CAUSE: A: Broken or shorled conductors.

ELECTRONIC, ELECTRICAL, AND ELECTROMECHANICAL PARTS FOR THE CIRCUITS INVOLVED IN THIS FUNCTION HAVE BEEN SELECTED FROM THE CLASS S OR EQUIVALENT APPROVED PARTS SELECTION (1). STRAIN GAUGE OPERATION IS WITHIN ITS ELASTIC RANGE, BELOW THE MATERIAL YIELD POINT. SUPPORT FOR THE STRAIN GAUGES IS PROVIDED BY ADDRESIVE AND FILM USED IN CONSTRUCTION AND ATTACHMENT OF THE STRAIN GAUGES (2). INTERCONNECTING WIRES FROM DIAPHRAGM TO TERMINAL HEADER SECURED BY POTTING STRIPS TO PREVENT MOVEMENT AND WIRE FATIGUE. THE ADDRESIVE AND FILM PROVIDE INSULATION FOR STRAIN GAUGES. LEADWIRES ARE UPPER WIRING POTTING PREVENTS WIRE MOVEMENT AND SUBSEQUENT WIRE FAILURE (4)

(1) 85M03928; (2) RC7001; (3) RL10008, RL10007, MSFC-SPEC-278; (4) RL10008

FAILURE CAUSE: C: Sensor inlet plugged.

ORBITER SYSTEM DESIGN INCORPORATES A FILTER IN THE OXYGEN AND FUEL FEED SYSTEM ELIMINATING PROPELLANT CONTAMINATION SOURCES (1). THE HELIUM SUBSYSTEM HAS A FILTER IN THE PCA PREVENTING CONTAMINATION ENTERING THE SYSTEM DURING PURGES (2). INLET PORT PASSAGE SIZE PROVIDES CONTAMINATION PROTECTION (3) MINOR FLOW IN THE SENSOR INLET DUE TO CLOSED CAVITY DESIGN REDUCES POTENTIAL FOR PARTICLE CONTAMINATION. PARTIAL BLOCKAGE OF THE INLET WILL NOT DEGRADE SENSOR FUNCTION.

(1) ICD 15M15000; (2) R0019450; (3) RC7001

FAILURE CAUSE: E: Fractured sensor diaphragm,

THE DIAPHRAGM IS MANUFACTURED FROM A-286. A-286 EXHIBITS RESISTANCE TO CORROSION AND RESISTANT TO HYDROGEN ENVIRONMENT EMRITTLEMENT (1). DESIGN CRITERIA FOR DURST AND PROOF PRESSURE REQUIREMENTS ARE IDENTICAL IN BOTH DESIGNS (2). THE MINIMUM FACTORS OF SAFETY MEET CELREQUIREMENTS (3). THE DIAPHRAGM MEETS HIGH CYCLE AND LOW CYCLE FATIGUE LIFE CELREQUIREMENTS (4).

(1) RSS-8562. (2) RC7001; (3) RSS-8546, CP32CR0003B; (4) RL00532 CP320R0003B

FAILURE CAUSE: F: Vacuum reference cavity damaged causing loss of vacuum.

THE OUTER CASE IS MANUFACTURED FROM CORROSION RESISTANT 304L CRES. THE OUTER CASE, CONNECTOR ASSEMBLY, AND BASE ASSEMBLY ARE WELDED TOGETHER TO ACCURACY COMPARED TO THE OPERATING PRESSURE RANGE IS MINIMAL.

(1) RC7001

FAILURE CAUSE: G: Broken pins.

CONNECTOR SELECTION OF THE ASSEMBLIES IS CONTROLLED BY ROCKETDYNE SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS (1). THE CONNECTOR DESIGN INCORPORATES FEATURES SUCH AS RUBBER SEALS, CORROSION RESISTANT PINS, LOCKING CONNECTORS, AND CONTROLLED ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS TO PREVENT MALFUNCTION. THE CONNECTORS ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH STANDARDS FOR USE ON ROCKET PROPELLED VEHICLES (2). THE PINS ARE NICKEL UNDERPLATED AND GOLD OVERPLATED TO PREVENT CORROSION AND MINIMIZE CONTACT RESISTANCE. THE PLATING IS CONTROLLED PER SPECIFICATION (2). THE CONNECTORS HAVE COMPLETED HARNESS DVS TESTING AND SENSOR DVS TESTING (3).

(1) RC7001; (2) RC1231; (3) DVS-SSME-202, DVS-SSME-203

Compoli. .. Group:

Composit: .. Group: Igniters and Sonsors
CIL Item; J223-01, J224-01

Component: Parl Number: FPB and OPB Purge Pressure Transducers (P2.5, P2.4)

Pari Number: Falluro Modo: RE22J3/RES7801, RE2233/RES7801 No output or arroneous output signal. Prepared: Approved: M. Oliver T. Nguyen 3/30/99

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Design / Document Reference

FAILURE CAUSE: H: Change of Internal resistance caused by moisture, corrosion, or contamination.

SENSORS ARE HERMETICALLY SEALED TO PROTECT FROM CONTAMINATION. A BACK FILL OF THE SENSOR CAMITY IS DONE TO INCORPORATE AN INERT PURGE PREVENTING CORROSION OR CONDENSATION IN THE SENSOR. LEAK RATE REQUIREMENTS ARE CONTROLLED PER SPECIFICATION TO PREVENT INDUCTANCE OF FOREIGN SUBSTANCES AND PREVENT LOSS OF THE INERT GAS BACKFILL. INTERNAL POTTING, PASSIVATION, VARNISHING, AND COATING WITH ADHESIVE PROTECTS FROM INTERNAL CORROSION (1)

(1) RC7001

FAILURE CAUSE: ALL CAUSES

SENSOR SYSTEM DESIGN PROVIDES REDUNDANCY TO THE ELECTRICAL COMPONENTS TO PRECLUDE ALL SINGLE POINT FAILURES OF THE CONTROL FUNCTIONS. AN IDENTICAL DESIGN SENSOR IS USED AT THE FUEL PREBURNER PG PORT WHERE THE ENVIRONMENT IS MORE EXTREME. THE SENSORS ARE A VENDOR ITEM, DRAWING SPECIFICATIONS AND MANUFACTURING PROCESSES ARE CONTROLLED BY ROCKETDYNE (1). ALL SENSOR DESIGN ARE SUBJECTED TO A CRITICAL DESIGN REVIEW. ANY DESIGN CHANGES ARE RE-VIEWED (1). THE SENSORS HAVE COMPLETED DESIGN VERIFICATION TESTING (20. INCLUDING VIBRATION TESTING (3). THE MINIMUM FACTORS OF SAFETY MEET CEI REQUIREMENTS (4). THE SENSORS WERE ANALYZED FOR HIGH CYCLE FATIGUE AND LOW CYCLE FATIGUE LIFE AND MEET CEI REQUIREMENTS (5). TABLE J223, J224 LISTS ALL THE FMEA/CIL WELDS AND IDENTIFIES THOSE WELDS IN WHICH THE CRITICAL INITIAL FLAW SIZE IS NOT DETECTABLE, AND THOSE WELDS IN CHICH THE ROOT SIDE IS NOT ACCESSIBLE FOR INSPECTION. THESE WELDS HAVE BEEN ASSESSED AS ACCEPTABLE FOR FLIGHT BY RISK ASSESSMENT (6). SENSORS FROM ENGINE 2010 WERE RESUBJECTED TO ACCEPTANCE TESTING. ALL SENSORS MET ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA WITH THE EXCEPTION OF ONE WHICH EXHIBITED A MINOR ZERO SHIFT. THE CONTROLLER MONITOR SYSTEM IS COMPRISED OF REDUNDANTSENSOR ELECTRONICS, REDUNDANT HARNESSES, AND REDUNDANT CONTROLLER CHANNELS (7).

(1) RC7001. (2) DVS-SSME-203, RSS-8660; (3) RSS-203-13, RSS-203-14; (4) RSS-8546, CP320R0003B; (5) RL00532, CP320R0003B; (6) RSS-8756; (7) CP405R0008 3 2 3.5

SSME_FN CIL INSPECTION AND TEST

Companent Group: CIL Item:

Component:

Part Number; Fallure Mode: Igniters and Sensors J223-01, J224-01 FPB and OPB Purge Pressure Transducers (P2.5, P2.4) RE2233/RES7001, RE2233/RES7001 No output or erroneous output signal.

Prepared:

M. Oliver

Approved:
Approval Data:
Change #;
Directive #;

T. Nguyen 3/30/99

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Fallure Causes	Significant Characteristics	Page:	1012
A	Significant Characteristics	Inspection(s) / Test(s)	Document Reference
^	SINGLE PICKUP, DUAL OUTPUT, PRESSURE TRANSDUCER		RES2233 / RES7001
	INTEGRITY OF INTERNAL ELECTRONICS COMPONENTS	PROCESSES USED IN THE TRANSDUCER MANUFACTURE AND ASSEMBLY ARE VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION AND INCLUDE: - SOLDERING OF ELECTRICAL CONNECTIONS ATTACHMENT TO TERMINALS ENCAPSULATION OF COMPONENTS.	RL10009 RL10007 RL10008
c	PRESSURE TRANSDUCER	- · · · · · · · · · ·	
	EXTERNAL CLEANLINESS	TRANSPIRED AND VERIFIED OF TAXABLE DRA	RES2233 / RES7001
		TRANSDUCERS ARE VERIFIED CLEANED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RC7001
E	PRESSURE TRANSDUCER		RE\$2233 / RE\$7001
	DIAPHRAGM INTEGRITY	TRANSDUCER DIAPHRAGM IS PROOF PRESSURE TESTED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RC7001
f	PRESSURE TRANSDUCER		RE\$2233 / RE\$7001
	REFERENCE CAVITY INTEGRITY	TRANSDUCERS ARE PROOF PRESSURE TESTED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RC7001
	•	REFERENCE CAVITY IS LEAK CHECKED TO VERIFY SEAL PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	
3	PRESSURE TRANSDUCER		RES2233 / RES7001
	CONNECTOR RECEPTABLE		RE51231
	CONNECTOR INTEGRITY	THE PLATING ON THE CONNECTOR PINS IS INSPECTED PER SPECIFICATION REQUIREMENTS.	RC1231
		THE FOLLOWING TESTS ARE PERFORMED DURING MANUFACTURING AND SENSOR ACCEPTANCE: - INSULATION RESISTANCE BETWEEN PINS AND THE CASE IS VERIFIED TO BE WITHIN - SPECIFICATION - DIELECTRIC VOLTAGE TESTS MEASURE THE CURRENT LEAKAGE BETWEEN PINS AND CASE AND VERIFY THEM TO BE WITHIN SPECIFICATION TRANSDUCER BRIDGE RESISTANCE IS VERIFIED TO BE WITHIN SPECIFICATION.	RC7001 RC7001 RC7001
1	PRESSURE TRANSDUCER		PEC4433 DEC5444
	HERMETIC SEAL INTEGRITY	CLEANLINESS REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED PER SPECIFICATION DURING MANUFACTURING OF THE TRANSDUCERS.	RES2233 / RES7001 RC7001
		AFTER THE CASE IS WELDED, HELIUM LEAK TESTS ARE PERFORMED TO VERIFY HERMETIC SEAL.	
ACL CAUSES	PRESSURE TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY INTEGRITY	ALL VENDOR INSPECTION AND TEST CRITERIA IS UNDER ROCKETDYNE APPROVAL AND CONTROL.	RES2233 / RES7001

Component Group; CIL Item;

igniters and Sensors

Component: Part Number: J223-01, J224-01 FPB and OPB Purge Pressure Transducers (P2.5, P2.4)

Failure Mode:

RE2233/RES7001, RE2223/RES7001 No output or erroneous output signal.

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Fai ure Causes	Significant Characteristics	Inspection(s) / Test(s)		
			Document Reference	
ALL CAUSES	ASSEMBLY INTEGRITY	TRANSDUCERS ARE SUBJECTED TO A WORKMANSHIP SCREENING ACCEPTANCE TEST INCLUDING VIBRATION. THERMAL CYCLING, AND FUNCTIONAL TESTS.	RC7001	
	HOT FIRE ACCEPTANCE TESTING (GREEN RUN)	SENSOR OPERATION IS VERIFIED THROUGH HOT FIRE ACCEPTANCE TESTING.	RL0048(
	DATA REVIEW	ALL CONTROLLER DATA FROM THE PREVIOUS FLIGHT OR HOT FIRE IS REVIEWED. ANY ANOMALOUS CONDITION NOTED REQUIRES FURTHER TESTING OR HARDWARE REPLACEMENT PRIOR TO THE NEXT FLIGHT,	MSFC PLN 1228	
	PRE-FLIGHT CHECKOUT	SENSORS ARE VISUALLY INSPECTED.	OMRSD V418u0,030	
		SENSOR OPERATION IS VERIFIED EVERY MISSION FLOW BY SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE CONTROLLER SENSOR ELECTRICAL CHECKOUT. (LAST TEST)	OMRSD V41AQ0.010 OMRSD S00FAD.213	

Failure History:

Comprehensive failure history data is maintained in the Problem Reporting database (PRAMS/PRACA)

Reference NASA letter SA21/88/308 and Rockeldyne letter 88RC09761

Operational Use

Not Applicable.







Comparient Group:

Igniters and Sensors

flem Name;

FPB and OPB Purge Pressure Transducers (P2.5, P2.4) J223, J224

flem Number: Part Number:

RE2233/RE57001, RE2233/RES7001

Prepared: Approved:

M. Oliver T. Nguyen 3/30/99

Approval Date: Change #: Directive #:

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Base Line Rationale	Variance	Page:	1 of 1	
		Change Rationale	Variant Dash Number RE\$7001-207 ,227 RE2233-021	
1923, U224 - These wolds have been assessed and determined to have moreved ultimate and yield drengths, endurance limits and facture toughness over those welds sted in the weld assessment (VRS-550).	Welds were assessed as acceptable for hight by risk assessment (RSS-8756).	New dasign eliminates one weld and increases overall component strength. USE AS IS RATIONALE: Welded assemblies maet all CEI requirements (RSS-8756).		
1223, J224 - New design improves producibility. Inspectability and the frankducer. New Jesuph reduces the risk of the attroduction of conductive contamination.	An internal vacuum cese is used for zero pressuro reference point.	New design eliminates internal vacuum case and reduces potential for conductive contamination. USE AS IS rationale: Functionally of zero pressure reference is maintained.	RE\$7001-217, 237 RE2233-021	

SSME_ <u>EA/CIL</u> WELD JOINTS

Component Group: , CIL Hem;

Igniters and Sensors J223, J224

FPB and OPB Purge Pressure Transducers (P2.5, P2.4) RE2233/RES7001, RE2233/RES7001

Component: Part Number:

M. Offver T. Nguyen 3/30/89

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Basic Part Number	Weld Number	Weld Type	Class	Root Side Not Access	Flaw S	lze Not		Commonle	
RE2233/RES7001							·	- Cammenta	
JKR1900	CCC-1	EBW	II	×	x	x			
JLD1900	CCC-2	EBW	ři.	x		•			
JVA1900	CCC-5	EBM	II	×	•				
_	RE2233/RES 7001 JKR1900 JLD1900	RE2233/RES 7001 JKR1900 CCC-1 JLD1900 CCC-2	RE2233/RES7001 JKR1900 CCC-1 EBW JLD1900 CCC-2 EBW	RE2233/RES 7001 JKR1900 CCC-1 EBW II JLD1900 CCC-2 EBW II	Side Not Side Not Access	Root Flaw S Side Net Determined Side Net Side Net Determined Side Net Determined Side Net Side Net	Basic Part Number Weld Number Weld Type Class Access HCF LCF	Root Flaw Size Not Defectable	Root Flaw Size Not Detectable